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Abstract
Many OECD countries have changed the rules for immigrants in recent decades, gen-
erally making harder to enter and to stay. France is one example. This paper studies the
immigrants' response to the 2004 reform of the immigration law, which made it harder for
foreigners to obtain resident status. The strategy for identiﬁcation exploits a discontinuity
in exposure to the reform, determined by the time of entry. The ﬁrst result is that the 2004
reform prompted a wave of departures among low-skilled, unemployed, unmarried men.
This eﬀect is observed among those with previous work experience in France and searching
for work, indicating that the diﬃculty to ﬁnd a job without resident status creates an in-
centive for outmigration. Second, the obtention of resident status lowers signiﬁcantly but
marginally the labor supply of women, consistently with an adjustment role of women's
work, and with a small substitution eﬀect of labor income with welfare beneﬁts. Overall,
these results suggest that restrictions on access to resident status prompted outmigration,
but not among the population with the most elastic labor supply. Thus, the reform did
not reach its main objectives: selection occurred, but not of those less willing to work;
cutting access to beneﬁts increased labor supply, but only marginally.
JEL classiﬁcation: F22, J61,J65.
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1 Introduction
The design of an optimal immigration policy, designed to maximize the beneﬁts from immigra-
tion accruing to native residents, is a matter of debate among destination countries. In France,
immigration policy has been given a restrictive turn from 2002 on, with a law in 2004-2005
reforming the legal regime for foreigners living in the country1. This policy pursued two main
objectives: the selection of high-skilled immigrants, to avoid adverse labor market impacts on
low-skilled nationals; and the limitation of access to welfare beneﬁts for foreigners, to maximize
net contributions of foreigners and limit free-riding on the welfare system. To achieve these
objectives, the law introduced a number of restrictions for the entry and stay of foreigners
in France; most importantly, it modiﬁed the conditions for obtaining resident status, making
obtention longer and more conditional.
This study estimates the impact of the 2004 law on migration decisions and labor supply
of immigrants. First it measures the impact of the law on immigrants' decisions to stay or
leave the country. Second, it studies the impact on the labor supply of foreigners. It shows
that the passing of the law in 2004 triggered a substantial movement of departures of foreigners
leaving the country, concentrated among low-skilled, unemployed, young men. Importantly,
those departures are observed among individuals looking for jobs and having worked in France
before, suggesting that the eﬀect is due to a higher diﬃculty to ﬁnd a job, rather than to
harder access to welfare beneﬁts. Second, we ﬁnd a positive impact on labor supply, restricted
to the population of low-skilled women, suggesting that women labor supply may play a role
of adjustment.
The empirical strategy exploits the speciﬁcity of immigration law in France to perform our
impact analysis. Before the 2004 law, resident status could be granted to a foreigner after 3
years of legal presence in the country, and was granted in a quasi-automatic way to foreigners
after 5 years of presence.The 2004 reform increased this minimum duration to more than 5
years and added a number of conditions for obtention.2 Thus, foreigners entered in France in or
after 2000 faced the new regime for resident status, and lost access to a resident card at 5 years
1The reform, known as the ﬁrst Sarkozy law on immigration, was initially voted in Parliament in 2003,
then entered in force on November 24th 2004 (Ordonnance du n◦ 2004-1248 du 24 novembre 2004, see
http://www.journal-oﬃciel.gouv.fr/frameset.html)
2The foreigner's integration into french society becomes a condition for obtaining the card. Notably, a
suﬃcient knowledge of french language is required (article 7). In addition, decision regarding the card is taken
by the prefectoral authority, considering proofs of intention to install durably in France, [his] conditions of
professional activity, and means of subsistence (art. 29). Foreigners wishing to install in France must sign a
contract of integration.
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of presence. We apply a double-diﬀerence strategy, comparing foreign individuals in the the
'post-2000 cohorts' (those arrived in or after 2000) to those in the pre-1999 cohorts. We ﬁrst
study the impact of the passing of the law, in late 2004/2005, on departure decisions. In the
second part, we study the impact of obtaining resident status (this time with pre-1999 cohorts
being 'treated' and post-2000 cohorts being the control group).
Taken together, our results suggest that the 2004 immigration law reform in France partially
reached its objectives. It had a selection eﬀect on the immigrant population in France by
prompting some foreigners to leave; this eﬀect is substantial (about 5% higher departure rates
among the population impacted) and quite striking, showing that rights granted to foreigners
have a direct inﬂuence on their decision to stay or leave; in other words migration decisions are
not irreversible, despite the costs of settlement and re-migration. To our knowledge this is the
ﬁrst study to show this type of result.
Interestingly, the policy succeeded in selecting speciﬁc proﬁles, inasmuch as increased de-
parture rates are found among low-skilled, unemployed workers. However, while the reform
intended to restrict mainly family immigration and in general, all immigrants susceptible to be
net recipients of welfare beneﬁts, our results indicate that the departures increased among those
looking for a job, and who previously worked in France, suggesting that the increased diﬃculty
to ﬁnd a job without a card, rather than access to beneﬁts, motivated these departures.
Concerning labor supply, results show an eﬀect of resident status obtention only for a speciﬁc
population, low-skilled women. They show that the probability of transition into employment
decreases after obtention of a resident card (that is, after 5 years of presence for immigrants
arrived before 1999). This is consistent with the reform targeting in priority family immigration.
It suggests that women's work might play a role of adjustment in those families, with the search
for work becoming less systematic once resident status is obtained. This could be due to access
to some beneﬁts linked to resident status.
Importantly, we show that the selection eﬀect occurring in 2005 with higher departure rates
is not responsible for the impact observed in the following years on labor supply. In other
words, higher employment rates among post-2000 cohorts are not due to selection of those with
higher employment probabilities, but to the newly imposed restrictions on resident status.
Overall, these results taken together suggest that modifying conditions for resident status
in France had two distinct eﬀects: on one hand, living as a foreigner without resident status
represents an additional cost, so that raising obstacles for its obtention prompts some people to
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leave. On the other hand, resident status gives a right to beneﬁts, which impacts labor supply
through a change in reservation wages. However this labor supply eﬀect is relatively limited:
it is present only among women, and there is no evidence of higher exit rates from the labor
market. These results taken toghether run against the hypothesis of free riding on welfare, the
main target of the reform.
The question of a potential welfare magnet impact, by which generous Welfare systems in
rich countries increases inﬂows of immigrants into these countries, is the matter of an intense
debate in the recent literature. Borjas (1999), Dodson (2001), De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009),
among others, ﬁnd evidence of it; while Pedersen et al. (2008), Giulietti et al. (2011) ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant evidence supporting this hypothesis. These studies have in common
to rely on a cross-country or cross-state empirical approach, which raises endogeneity issues
as it may be diﬃcult to control for unobserved determinants of immigrants' location choices.
The approach in this paper is diﬀerent in two aspects. First, it relies on a change, in one
country, of the legal conditions faced by immigrants to enter and stay; this panel approach
exploits the quasi-experimental setting created by this reform, with diﬀerent groups in the
foreign population being impacted diﬀerently by it. It also allows to mitigate the impact of all
other variables speciﬁc to France as a destination country, which have not changed concurrently
with the legal change considered. Kaushal (2005) adopts a similar approach, exploiting state-
level variation in access to means-tested beneﬁts for noncitizens in the US; it ﬁnds no eﬀect on
location choices of new immigrants.
Second, by showing evidence of an impact of the reform on departure decisions, this study
brings evidence on the outmigration side of the welfare magnet debate. There is, to my knowl-
edge, no study of this question. Outmigration is generally the subject of less studies than
inﬂows, as it is generally harder to observe. Bellemare (2007) is close to this paper in this re-
spect. This author also uses attrition in panel data, to observe outmigration among immigrants
in Germany. However the variable of interest is the legal migration duration, and it ﬁnds that
the shortening of this duration provoked departures of immigrants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains immigration law in France,
in particular the two main types of permit, temporary and long-term, which non-EU foreigners
can hold in France. Section 3 looks at the impact of the 2004 reform of immigration law on
outmigration among foreigners to which the reform applied. Section 5 studies the impact of
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the reform on the labor supply of foreigners, asking whether access to resident status has an
impact on the probability of exiting unemployment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Immigration law in France and the 2004 reform
Non-EU immigrants aged 18 or more can stay legally in France by holding one of two main
types of permit: one temporary card with one year duration, and one resident card lasting 10
years.3
The 1-year card has to be obtained (at entry) and has to be renewed thereafter every year.
It is granted on the basis of work, studies, or family motives. In addition to justifying these
motives, the candidate must prove his ability to sustain himself. The ﬁrst one-year card has
generally to be asked for in France, at the administrative oﬃce of the foreigner's place of
residence. In some cases, the initial 1-year card is delivered along with the visa of the same
duration. This is the case of students and workers. To take one example, a foreigner hired by a
ﬁrm in France applies for a work visa 4. In case of acceptance, he obtains the visa, along with
an initial 1-year card. For every additional year spent in France, he has to renew his card, either
with the same or with diﬀerent motives (e.g., family motives) as for the initial card. Conditions
for renewing the temporary card are the same as for the ﬁrst delivery.
The resident card gives legal right to stay in France for a period of ten years. It is granted
automatically (de plein droit) for some categories of foreigners; on a discretionary basis for
others. Automatic delivery concerns only children or parents of a French person, and refugees.
For all other categories, delivery is conditional on the evaluation, by the administration, of the
candidate's suﬃcient resources, as well as of his willingness to integrate into the French society,
a condition introduced by the 2004 reform (see below). The resident card gives stability by
avoiding its holder the uncertainty associated to the renewal of the temporary card every year.
After a relative pro-immigration stance of the left government in power in France from
1997 to 2002, marked by a mass regularization of about 70000 illegal migrants, the centre-right
party government elected in 2002 took a harder stance, voicing its willingness to curb illegal
immigration, and to restrict access to legal status. The then interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy
(to become president in 2007) was particularly vocal and active in his goal to make immigration
3This excludes 1- to 6-months permits for special motives such as health care.
4in the category wage worker or temporary worker, depending on the duration of the contract.
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more selective and more suited to the economic needs of the country.
Two reforms of immigration law were adopted under this government, in power from 2002
to 2007. The ﬁrst one, the 2004 reform, undertook to make conditions for entry and stay of
non-EU foreigners more stringent. In particular, conditions for obtaining the resident card
became more restrictive, with the removal of automatic access for a number of categories of
foreigners, including individuals justifying 5 years of legal presence in the country.5
Under the new law, these 5 years of legal presence became a condition for making the
demand, without guarantee of obtaining the card6. In addition, the condition of integration
into French society was introduced, to be appreciated by the administration, which increased
discretion in the delivery process. By making acceptance more dependent on administrative
judgement, the reform increased uncertainty for candidates and variability in the results (Spire,
2008). The number of resident card deliveries dropped from 39697 in 2003 to 24133 in 2006
(Ministry of Interior).
Another consequence of the reform was that, by raising the mimimum duration of stay
allowing to ask for a resident card, it also raised de facto the minimum length of stay for
obtaining the minimum allocation (RMI, revenu minimum d'insertion) for people without other
sources of income.7
3 Impact of the 2004 reform on outmigration
We start by examining the impact of the 2004 reform of France's immigration law, on the
composition of the foreign population living in the country. The law ended the automatic
obtention of the resident card after 5 years of presence in France; with it the 5 years became
the minimal duration, and it added a number of conditions for the obtention. In eﬀect, foreigners
5The other main ﬁeld of the 2004 reform was to reinforce repression against illegal immigration, with a
lengthening of jail terms for individuals helping illegal entry of immigrants, and a raise of sanctions for employers
of illegals.
The second reform, voted in 2006, was in the same spirit as the 2004 one. Delays for demanding family
reunion, resident status for marriage purposes, and nationality were raised. Signing a contract of integration (a
commitment to accept the host country's laws and values) becomes mandatory for all foreigners.
6The text of the law can be found on
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃchTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005702743dateTexte=20090903.
Articles concerning obtention of the resident card are Articles 21 to 25. See also GISTI (2003)
7The RMI was aimed at people without any work income and who were not eligible to contribution-based
unemployment beneﬁts. Individuals had to be 25 years old or more and had to commit to ﬁnding work. Students
and people living with a non-eligible partner were not eligible. It has been replaced in 2009 by the RSA (revenu
de solidarité active), which is more progressive and can be obtained by people with low income, with the amount
perceived decreasing with labor income.
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who were living in France for less than 5 years in 2004, saw their expected time to obtention of
a resident card lengthened by the law, and the probability of obtaining the card reduced.
One can expect that this legal change caused some immigrants to leave in 2004 or later.
This is of interest to us for two reasons. First we want to quantify this reaction, which is
informative about the reactivity of immigration to the legal conditions of stay oﬀered to im-
migrants in the host country. Second, those departures also create a selection problem for our
subsequent analysis of immigrant's labor supply response to the 2004 law: if decisions to leave
were not random among the population concerned, it implies that the observed diﬀerence in
labor supply between cohorts impacted by the law will result from a composition change as well
as a behavioral response, and we will need to disentangle these two channels.
Note that selection could also occur in the composition of arrivals in France after 2004;
however this selection will not matter for our estimates, as those arrived in 2004 or later reach
their 5 years of presence in 2009 or later, while our data end in 2009: thus our estimates of the
labour supply reaction do not use observations of those individuals. Therefore we will focus
here on the selection by departures.
We will address the selection issue in two steps. First, in this section, we test for selective de-
partures among the populations impacted by the 2004 law. This is done by looking for evidence
of higher departures among selective groups, such as those with less education, unemployed,
and with less prior work experience. Obtaining a resident card may facilitate access to a job,
as well as to housing. This may prompt those less likely to obtain a job in the ﬁrst place to
leave when the card becomes harder to obtain. Alternatively, people less likely to ﬁnd a job,
can be expected to rely more on welfare beneﬁts. If obtaining welfare beneﬁts was their major
reason for coming in the country in the ﬁrst place, then news that the obtention of the resident
card will take more time and be less certain, may prompt some of them to leave. We will try
to disentangle between these channels.
Second, in the next section, the analysis of labor supply response to the legal change in
2004 will also give us the opportunity to test for selection, by testing whether the law had an
eﬀect on labor supply of the individuals concerned by it, at the time of the announcement and
passing of the law, or at the change becomes eﬀective for them, which occurs 1 to 5 years later.
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3.1 Determinants of departures
We use the rotating panel structure of the data to observe departures from France, which is one
of the causes for attrition in the dataset. In this survey, each individual is normally interviewed
six quarters in a row. However, some individuals leave the survey before their sixth interview,
which can be due to death, a change of adress, or a departure from the country. Thus departures
cannot be directly observed. In the whole dataset, the rate of attrition is 7.5% among french
nationals, and 10.77% among foreigners. This suggests that roughly one quarter of all attrition
can be attributed to departures from the country, if we assume that death rates and rates of
moving out are not too diﬀerent between immigrants and natives. Our strategy consists in using
changes in attrition rates in time and across groups, and to control for classic determinants of
attrition (age, education level, employment status, marital status, housing occupation status),
in order to attribute those changes to changes in departure rates, once other possible factors of
attrition change have been ruled out.
More precisely, focusing on the population of foreigners living in France, we test the hy-
pothesis that the 2004 law prompted selective departures among the population of foreigners
impacted by the legal change, that is, all foreigners arrived in 2000 or later, who learnt in 2004
that they would not automatically obtain their resident card at their 5th year of presence. If
this is true, then we expect attrition rates to rise among the impacted populations, compared
to those arrived before 2000, who constitute the control group. The speciﬁcation used is the
following:
P [Ait = 1] = α + βXit + α.Post2000 + δ.Post2000 ∗ t > 2005 + λt + γd + it (1)
where Ait is an indicator for attrition, Post2000 is a indicator variable for an individual
being arrived in France in or after 2000; λt and γd are ﬁxed eﬀects for time and the duration of
stay in France; and Xit is a set of controls comprising age, nationality, marital status, gender,
employment status.
We can write P [Ait = 1] = P [Ait = 1|Depit = 1].P [Depit = 1] + P [Ait = 1|Depit =
0].P [Depit = 0]
and we assume that P [Ait = 1|Depit = 0] (the probability of attrition not caused by
departure) can vary over time, but is independent on other observable characteristics (Lewbel
2000). Thus, diﬀerencing between post-2000 and pre-2000 cohorts eliminates this component, so
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that remaining diﬀerences in the probability of attrition can be attributed to diﬀerent departure
rates.
The coeﬃcient δ is a double-diﬀerence estimator of the impact of the 2004 reform on the
probability of leaving the country: it measures the diﬀerence of attrition rates before and after
2004, for treated cohorts (post-2000 cohorts) relative for control cohorts (those arrived before
2000).
Time ﬁxed eﬀects control for changes in attrition rates across all foreigners, which can be due
to e.g. economic ﬂuctuations that would prompt a higher number of individuals to leave in bad
times. The post-2000 variable controls for diﬀerences in attrition rates across cohorts, which
could be due to diﬀerences in the composition of cohorts upon arrival in France. Finally, ﬁxed
eﬀects for the duration of stay in the country control for the possibility that post-2000 cohorts
could exhibit diﬀerent attrition rates than the others because of their more recent history in
France.
We estimate this model for all immigrants in the sample8 Results in table 1 show that there
is no sign of higher departure rates when considering the whole population (col. 2). However
distinguishing between employed and unemployed individuals (col. 3 and 4), it appears that
departures increased signiﬁcantly for unemployed people, among post-2000 cohorts, after 2005.
Table 2 thus focuses on unemployed immigrants, and examines when exactly did those
departures take place, and among which cohorts. Results show that the eﬀect is remarkably
sharp at the 2005 date and for post-2000 cohorts, consistenly with the law coming into eﬀect
in late 2004. Columns 1 and 2 show no eﬀect with placebo legal changes occuring in 2004 or
2006. Columns 3 and 4 show no eﬀect if assuming that the legal change would impact post-1998
cohorts, or post-2002 cohorts. These results reinforce the evidence for a causal eﬀect of the
2004 immigration law on departures of unemployed immigrants. In particular, they rule out
the possibility that results be driven by some interaction between diﬀerent emigration costs for
more recent/older cohorts, and economic ﬂuctuations in the period of study.
We then attempt to characterize more precisely the individuals most likely to leave in
response to the law. Table 3 splits the sample along several characteristics and tests where
the departure eﬀect is present. It shows that this eﬀect concerns only non-EU foreigners, of
low education level, and men; among men, only young and non-married men show a higher
propensity to leave (not shown). Foreigners of EU origin face less restrictions for staying and
8We keep individuals between 20 and 65 of age, non student, arrived in France after 1990. We put aside
cohorts arrived earlier in order to have similar number of 'treated' and 'untreated' cohorts in the sample.
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for the access to jobs and welfare beneﬁts than non-EU foreigners do in France, thus obtaining
a resident card does not matter much for them and the law has no eﬀect. Non-married men are
expected to have a higher propensity to leave as they have less ties in France; moreover, they
are generally more likely to participate in the labor market. Low education is generally coming
with a higher diﬃculty to ﬁnd a job. Thus these results suggest that the propensity to leave is
higher among those looking for a job, but with a lower probability to ﬁnd one. The 2004 law
seems to represent an obstacle for the access to jobs, which can prompt individuals with low
skills and little ties to leave.
In table 4 we try to discriminate more precisely between the hypotheses of the 2004 as an
'obstacle to jobs' vs 'obstacle to beneﬁts'. We run separately the model for unemployed men
searching for a job (col. 1) or not searching (col. 2)9. The departure eﬀect is present in both
groups with a non signiﬁcant diﬀerence betweent the two. However, it turns out that the eﬀect
on young men (below 40) is signiﬁcant only for those searching jobs. Alternatively, we split the
sample between those who did work since their arrival in France and those who did not(columns
3 and 4), a proxy for participation. We ﬁnd an increase in departures only among those who
had a job in France, suggesting again that departures are motivated by a higher diﬃculty to
ﬁnd a job in the future.
Overall, these results show that the 2004 immigration law, by changing the regime for resi-
dent status obtention for immigrants arrived after 2000 in France, triggered selective departures
among the population facing this legal change. The double-diﬀerence strategy and the precise
identiﬁcation of this eﬀect in time reduce the risk of a spurious correlation driving the results.
Departures are concentrated among the young, not married, non-EU male population, and
within it, those with low probabilities to ﬁnd a job are the most likely to leave. This suggests
that the main eﬀect of the law for the population concerned was to create obstacles to jobs. The
harder access to welfare beneﬁts, such as the minimum unemployment income (RSA), seems
to play less of a role in triggering departures: those not participating in the labor market, and
those who never worked in France, are not those who leave.
9Note that these results are subject to caution due to non-response and possible error in the job searching
question.
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Table 1: Departures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of attrition
Employed Unemployed
Low education -0.010c -0.010c -0.007 -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Intermediate educ. -0.012b -0.012b -0.006 -0.015c
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Married -0.026a -0.026a -0.014b -0.039a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Male 0.018a 0.018a 0.015a 0.027a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Post-2000 cohort -0.003 0.025 -0.026
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
t > 2005 x post-2000 cohort 0.007 -0.021 0.031c
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Fixed eﬀects Duration of stay, year, nationality, age
Controls Age, housing status
Observations 33593 33593 17949 15551
R2 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.028
Standard errors in parentheses. Linear probability model. Attrition deﬁned as individual
leaving sample before sixth interview. Post-2000 cohorts: indicator for arrival in France
in or after 2000. Low education: achieved less than high school education. Intermediate
education: graduate of high school/technical diploma/apprenticeship. Age controls: indica-
tor variable for 5-year brackets. Housing occupation status: landlord, mortgage repayment,
social housing, rent, free housing provided by family or friends. Observations include all
foreign individuals arrived after 1990, non student, of age between 20 and 65.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Table 2: Departures: falsiﬁcation tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of attrition (unemployed foreigners)
N 2000 2000 1998 2002
break 2004 2006 2005 2005
Low education -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Middle education -0.015c -0.015c -0.015c -0.015c
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married -0.039a -0.039a -0.039a -0.039a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.027a 0.027a 0.027a 0.027a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Post-N cohort -0.007 0.001 0.031c -0.038c
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
t > break x post-N cohort 0.004 -0.010 0.014 0.033
(0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
Fixed eﬀects Duration of stay, year, nationality, age
Controls Age, housing status
Observations 15551 15551 15551 15551
R2 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028
Standard errors in parentheses. Linear probability model. Model and controls as
in table 1.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Table 3: Departures by origin, education, gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probability of attrition (unemployed foreigners)
EU nonEU Low Educ MidEduc HighEduc Men Wmen
Low education 0.011 -0.015 -0.012 -0.009
(0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
Middle education -0.012 -0.017c -0.018 -0.013
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010)
Married -0.026 -0.040a -0.032a -0.038a -0.058a -0.031b -0.042a
(0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
Male 0.024c 0.030a 0.029a 0.025b 0.022
(0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Post-2000 cohort 0.023 -0.033c -0.051b -0.014 0.000 -0.062b -0.010
(0.037) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.019)
t > 2005 x -0.005 0.036b 0.052b 0.005 0.028 0.066b 0.014
post-2000 cohort (0.034) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.030) (0.019)
Fixed eﬀects Duration of stay, year, nationality, age
Controls Age, housing status
Observations 2757 12794 7021 4991 3539 4811 10740
R2 0.069 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.060 0.040 0.024
Standard errors in parentheses. Linear probability model. Model and controls as in table 1.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Table 4: Departures: by labor market status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of attrition
LM participation Worked in France before
age < 40
yes no yes no yes no
Low education 0.005 -0.010 -0.037c 0.023 -0.047a 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.012)
Middle education 0.009 -0.026b -0.018 -0.014 -0.034c -0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013)
Married -0.025b -0.047a -0.038b -0.024 -0.045a -0.038a
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011)
Male 0.027a 0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
Post-2000 cohort -0.060b -0.000 -0.063 -0.068 0.069 -0.019
(0.025) (0.021) (0.047) (0.042) (0.049) (0.021)
t > 2005 x post-2000 cohort 0.044c 0.017 0.075c 0.046 -0.036 0.015
(0.025) (0.021) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.022)
Fixed eﬀects Duration of stay, year, nationality, age
Controls Age, housing status
Observations 6964 8064 2657 2154 3024 7716
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation on the population of unemployed for-
eigners. Linear probability model. Model and controls as in table 1.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Table 5: Outmigration: year by year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probability of attrition
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Married -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Post-2001 cohort -0.025 -0.020 -0.000 -0.011 -0.005
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
t = year x post-2001 cohort 0.123b 0.078 -0.061 0.005 -0.027
(0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.066) (0.071)
Observations 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation on the population of unemployed for-
eigner men with low education. Linear probability model. Model and controls as
in table 1.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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4 Impact of the reform on labor supply
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of the 2004 law on labor supply of immigrants. We
focus on transitions out of unemployment, asking whether the harder conditions for obtaining
resident status had an impact on the time spent until taking a job. As for the previosu anal-
ysis on departures, the empirical strategy will be based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach,
comparing the labor supply of 'treated' and 'untreated' individuals. Here the treatment is the
obtention of the resident card, which was granted in a quasi-automatic way to foreigners with 5
years of presence before the law. Untreated individuals are those arrived after 2000, who under
the new regime had to wait longer than 5 years for the card, and faced additional conditions
for its obtention. Diﬀerences in economic environment (e.g. labor market conditions) at the
time of the treatment/non-treatment (i.e. 5 years after arrival) are controlled for using time
ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, in eﬀect, we use the 2004 legal change to measure the impact of the resident
status on labor supply, using post-2000 cohorts as a control group.
Note that this methodology gives us a low bound estimate of the true eﬀect of resident status,
as we do not directly observe resident card obtention: some immigrants may have obtained the
card at 5 years of presence, or a few years later.
4.1 Empirical model
We estimate a duration model of unemployment spells for immigrants in France. We start by
assuming a logit form for the discrete-time hazard function:
ln
hit
(1− hit) = θ(t) + λ(dit) + δAccessitβ
′Xit (2)
where hit is the hazard rate of unemployed individual i at time t (probability of transition
into employment); θ(t) and λ(dit) capture the dependence of the hazard rate on time t and on
duration of stay dit; Accessit denotes potential access to a resident card (depending on year of
arrival and duration of presence in France),and Xit is a vector of variables including and a set
of controls (age, education level, cohort).
Jenkins (1995) shows that the likelihood function for this problem is identical to the one for
a binary choice problem on a variable yit indicating transitions into employment. yit equals 0 for
individuals remaining in unemployment and for censored observations (unemployed individuals
exiting the sample). We use this simpliﬁcation method to estimate our model; note that this
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method also applies for other functional forms of the hazard rate, such as the complementary
log-log form which we will use for robustness checks.
In eﬀect, time and duration of stay ﬁxed eﬀects are used to estimate functions θ(t) and
λ(dit). Cohort ﬁxed eﬀects (by year of arrival in France) are added. Accessit takes value 1 for
cohorts arrived before 2000 and observed after 5 years of presence. Thus, coeﬃcient δ measures
the change in the probability of transition into employment for a 'treated' (pre-1999) foreigner
after 5 years of presence, relative to a non-treated foreigner.
4.2 Results
Table 6 examines the impact of gaining access to a resident card on the probability of a transition
into employment, testing diﬀerent scenarios for the precise date of entry into force of the new
legislation; and comparing with falsiﬁcation tests with fake minimal durations of stay for card
obtention (4 and 6 years instead of 5). Results make appear a signiﬁcant impact on transition
probabilities, only under the hypothesis that 1999, or 1998, represents the last year of arrival
giving right to card obtention at 5 years of presence. This is consistent with evidence on
departures presented in the previous section, which showed that the cohort of immigrants
arrived in France in the year 2000 was the ﬁrst to display higher departure rates in 2005. (Note
that it remains possible that some individuals from the 1999 were denied access, for instance
if the law took eﬀect toward the end of 2004; or that some 2000 individuals beneﬁt from the
previous legal regime for card obtention. We cannot observe directly this as we do not generally
observe the month of arrival, only the year.)
We run two 'placebo' tests based on a fake duration of stay for obtaining the card, of 4 or
6 years instead of 5. Remarkably, these regressions display no signiﬁcant impact, ruling out
the possibility that a diﬀerence in the pattern of integration into the labor market over time
could explain our result. This also shows that the 5 years constraint for obtaining the card
was binding. They show that the obtention of the resident card for pre-2000 foreigners had a
signiﬁcant negative impact on the probability of transition into employment.
Next, we examine the risk of selection driving our results. The previous section has shown
that the passing of the law in 2005 triggered departures among some speciﬁc groups of foreigners.
There are two ways in which this may aﬀect our results. First, post-2000 cohorts (those facing
the legal change) may diﬀer in composition from pre-2000 cohort. This does not mean that
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those cohorts are not a valid control group anymore in our strategy, provided that diﬀerences
in transition probabilities across cohorts are controlled for.
In table 7, we ensure that this is the case by controlling for a change in post-2000 cohorts after
2005 (col. 1). This does not aﬀect our result. Second, we try keeping only observations of post-
2000 cohorts after 2005 (col. 2), so that cohort ﬁxed eﬀects capture the diﬀerent composition of
this population after that date. Again, our coeﬃcient of interest is not substantially aﬀected.
Lastly, we try deﬁning our 'treatment' as 'posterior to 2005' or 2006 for post-2000 cohorts,
with pre-2000 cohorts being the control. This tests if selective departures at that date may
drive the results. Although the coeﬃcient is positive, consistently with selective departures of
individuals with low transition probabilities, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant and not comparable
in amplitude to our eﬀect of interest.
These results show that our results are unlikely to be driven by selection. We rely on the
diﬀerence of timing in the treatment (after 5 years of presence) and in the selection, which
occurs after 2005 for all cohorts. If departures occurring in 2005, 2006 or subsequent years were
driving the results, we would expect to ﬁnd an eﬀect not only at 5 years of presence but also
at shorter or longer durations. Table 6 and columns 5-7 of 7 show that this is not the case for
any duration but 5 years.
We will now characterize more precisely the population concerned by this eﬀect. This is
done in table 8. This table shows that the impact on labor supply is present only for women,
both those living in couple or not. Overall, this suggests a pattern where women labor supply
could play a role of adjustment within immigrant families. There could be substitution between
this source of income and some welfare beneﬁts such as the minimum income (RSA), or some
family allocations. However, columns 5 and 6 show no eﬀect when considering transitions out
of, not into, employment: column 5 ﬁts the probability of exiting the labor market, either by
leaving a job or by stopping job search; column 6 focuses only on stopping job search. in both
cases, there is no evidence that resident card obtention had any impact on those exits. This
suggests that the eﬀect on labor supply is relatively limited.
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Table 6: Transitions into employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
placebo tests
N 1999 1998 1997 2000 1999
T 5 years 5 years 4 yrs. 6 yrs.
Access to Resident Card -0.441b -0.468 0.049 -0.031 -0.430 -0.131
(arrival≤ N x dur. stay ≥ T ) (0.209) (0.294) (0.645) (0.178) (0.290) (0.209)
Length of stay > T years -0.038 -0.072 -0.108 -0.099 0.205 -0.062
(0.142) (0.139) (0.138) (0.147) (0.130) (0.159)
Duration of inactivity -0.438a -0.432a -0.426a -0.427a -0.438a -0.431a
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
Has worked in France 0.194 0.207 0.222 0.219 0.197 0.211
(0.138) (0.138) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139)
Low education -0.354a -0.353a -0.348a -0.348a -0.347a -0.347a
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Middle education -0.210b -0.206b -0.205b -0.205b -0.204b -0.204b
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Fixed eﬀects Year, year of arrival, occupation, age
Observations 12181 12181 12181 12181 12181 12181
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
chi2 663.246 659.434 657.173 658.096 662.056 658.502
Standard errors in parentheses. Access to RC: year of arrival in France ≤ N x duration of stay in
France ≥ T years.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Table 7: Transitions to employment: testing for selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment: post-N Post-2005 placebo access
N 2005 2006 only (*)
Access to Resident Card -0.781a -0.681 -0.470 0.199 -0.080
(0.271) (0.414) (0.519) (0.219) (0.179)
Length of stay > 5 years 0.289c -0.004 0.069 0.065 0.051
(0.165) (0.189) (0.136) (0.136) (0.140)
post-2000 x t ≥ 2005 -0.238 0.095 0.095
(0.213) (0.173) (0.173)
Duration of inactivity -0.423a -0.436a -0.436a -0.484a -0.427a -0.423a -0.431a
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.086) (0.063) (0.062) (0.065)
Has worked in France 0.231 0.214 0.214 0.102 0.232c 0.238c 0.223
(0.143) (0.141) (0.141) (0.181) (0.136) (0.136) (0.141)
Low education -0.371a -0.364a -0.364a -0.503a -0.363a -0.363a -0.362a
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.133) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Middle education -0.229b -0.221b -0.221b -0.354a -0.219b -0.221b -0.220b
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.128) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Fixed eﬀects Year, year of arrival, occupation, age
Observations 11685 11685 11685 7328 11685 11685 11685
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.108 0.108 0.108
chi2 704.959 698.473 698.473 497.804 696.688 696.156 698.337
Standard errors in parentheses. Access to RC: year of arrival in France ≤ N x duration of stay in
France ≥ T years.
(*) In this speciﬁcation observations of post-2000 individuals are kept after 2005 only.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Table 8: Transitions into employment: by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transitions into employment Labor market exits
Women
Men Women Couple single
Access to Resident Card -0.285 -1.000a -0.639c -2.067a -0.117 -0.129
(0.308) (0.324) (0.385) (0.660) (0.311) (0.360)
Length of stay > 5 years 0.140 0.244 0.205 -0.008 0.069 0.069
(0.203) (0.202) (0.236) (0.426) (0.175) (0.200)
Duration of inactivity -0.432a -0.473a -0.534a -0.182
(0.068) (0.076) (0.085) (0.163)
Low education -0.083 -0.590a -0.516a -0.854a -0.022 0.024
(0.144) (0.149) (0.170) (0.322) (0.134) (0.150)
Middle education 0.068 -0.499a -0.424b -0.926a 0.095 0.015
(0.141) (0.146) (0.167) (0.330) (0.127) (0.145)
Fixed eﬀects Year, year of arrival, occupation, age
Observations 3515 8665 7245 1370 8583 3679
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.112 0.126 0.117 0.054 0.016
chi2 161.340 411.010 375.015 81.523 207.067 37.146
Standard errors in parentheses. Access to RC: year of arrival in France ≤ 1999 x duration of stay in
France ≥ 5 years.
Column 5: dependent variable= probablity of leaving employment or stopping job search. Column
6: probability of stopping job search.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of making access to resident status more diﬃcult for
immigrants. This question is of great interest for immigration countries, in a context where
many of these countries attempt to deﬁne immigration policy schemes to optimize the beneﬁts
and reduce the costs of immigration. The question of how to grant access to resident status to
foreigners is central to this debate. Answering this question requires weighing several eﬀects:
• Making access to resident status harder by lengthening the minimum duration of presence
and adding conditions is expected to act as a general barrier to immigration. It can also
be expected to have a selection eﬀect, possibly by selecting migrants with higher skills
and/or willingness to work.
• By making living conditions in the country more precarious, and by limiting access to
safety nets such as welfare beneﬁts, such policy is also likely to increase labor supply of
immigrants, possibly worsening ladverse labor market impacts of immigration on native
workers.
This study contributes to quantifying these eﬀects. First, is shows evidence of an important
selection eﬀect, showing that adding obstacles to obtention of the resident status prompted
some individuals among unemployed, low-skilled men, to leave the country. This eﬀect is
quantitatively important, with departure rates augmenting by about 5% among this population.
Interestingly, this eﬀect is absent among medium and high-skilled individuals, showing that
the policy succeeds in creating selection without being explicitly skill-based. Additional tests
suggest that the motive for leaving should be the diﬃculty to ﬁnd a job without resident status,
rather than lower expected welfare beneﬁts. In particular, this results goes against the so-called
welfare magnet hypothesis.
Thus, the policy pursued with the 2004 immigration law reform in France seems to have
partially reached its goal, which was to select high-skilled people and those more likely and more
willing to work among immigrants, and to discourage others to come or stay in the country.
Unfortunately we do not observe the trajectory of those who leave, and therefore cannot
study whether they return to the origin country or opt for another host country to settle.
Turning to the eﬀect on the labor supply of foreigners in France, results show a positive
impact on labor supply limited to the population of women. This may be explained by a role
of adjustment played by women labor supply. There may be substitution between women labor
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supply and some welfare beneﬁts. However, there is no evidence of higher exit rates from the
labor market following obtention of the resident status; or of people stopping to search for jobs.
This suggests that increase of labor supply due to the reform has been limited.
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